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ABSTRACT 
Current architectures typically focus on the software-based protection 
mechanisms rather than hardware for providing protection. In fact, hardware security 
mechanisms can be critical for the construction of a secure system. If hardware security 
mechanisms are properly utilized in a system, security policy enforcement can be 
simplified. Systems could be constructed for which serious security threats would be 
eliminated. 
This thesis explores the Intel IA-64 processor's hardware support and its 
relationship to software for building a secure system. To analyze the support provided by 
the architecture, hardware protection mechanisms were examined. This analysis focused 
on the following mechanisms: privilege levels, access rights, region identifiers and 
protection key registers. Since protection checks are made through the translation 
lookaside buffer (TLB) during the virtual-to-physical translations, the TLB structure was 
an area of focus throughout the research for this thesis. 
Proper use of the TLB-based hardware protection features permits protection in 
the IA-64 architecture. It enables the processor hardware and the operating system to 
collaborate to enforce security policies efficiently. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the IA-64 architecture's support for 
building a secure and reliable system. The IA-64 supports the paged virtual memory 
model, where protection is applied to each page on a memory access. Actually, there are 
two different types of protection mechanisms provided by the IA-64 processor prior to 
accessing a page. The first one is the page access right bits in the TLB associated with 
each translation. This protection mechanism provides privilege level-granular access to a 
page. The second mechanism is the protection keys that allow domain-granular access to 
a page. A domain is defined by protection key registers and offers an efficient method for 
the operating system to control access rights to groups of pages. 
A secure system must allow the processes to share data in a safe and efficient 
manner to be able to enforce a security policy reliably. To achieve this, the IA-64 
architecture implements hybrid SAS/MAS models that combine unique RIDs for per 
process regions and shared RIDs with protection keys for per-page protection. 
This analysis found that the IA-64 architecture protection features enable the 
processor hardware and the operating system to collaborate to enforce the security 
mechanisms efficiently among the processes. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.       BACKGROUND 
The architectural design goal of the IA-64 is to address an efficient 
hardware/software approach in which the processor hardware, the compiler, and the 
operating system cooperate with each other to deliver higher-performance systems [Ref. 
18]. 
To support security, processor architectures must provide security mechanisms 
without sacrificing efficiency and performance. Currently, there are a limited number of 
computer systems available to process information with different levels of sensitivity. 
Also, there are various methods of providing protection associated with these systems. 
The main purpose of these methods is to permit the operating system to protect itself 
from misuse by applications. Misuse could involve the unauthorized modification of the 
operating system and its databases. It could also involve jumps into the operating system 
without the validation and code vectoring provided by carefully constructed entry points. 
To achieve protection for the operating system, a privilege bit is used by processors to 
distinguish between operating system and user modes. This is required since the 
operating system must protect itself from users and must have a means of distinguishing 
privileged from non-privileged execution sequences. There should also be a mechanism 
to protect processes from each other and the operating system from the processes. This is 
accomplished through the use of both the privilege bit and an address space isolation 
mechanism. 
Today, virtual memory schemes are considered to be the building block of 
address space separation mechanisms in processor architectures. There are two different 
types of virtual memory models: segmented and paged virtual memories. Segmented 
virtual memory divides the memory into different size segments and supports the use of 
descriptor registers to control access to memory address spaces. Paged virtual memory 
generally provides protection through translation lookaside buffer (TLB) structures 
during virtual-to-physical address translations. 
B.       THESIS SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the IA-64 architecture's support for 
building a secure and reliable system. The IA-64 supports the paged virtual memory 
model, where protection is applied to each page on a memory access. On the other hand, 
unlike traditional architectures, where one of two address space models is supported, the 
IA-64 processor hardware is designed to support both multiple address space (MAS) and 
single address space (SAS) models. In the IA-64 architecture, there is actually no "SAS 
operating system" or "MAS operating system" mode. The difference between the two 
operating system models is the encoded policy enforced by the operating system. In other 
words, the difference comes through the management of the region identifiers (RIDs) and 
protection keys by the operating system [Ref. 2]. 
In this thesis, support for SAS/MAS operating systems and the security features 
associated with these models have been surveyed. Moreover, this thesis provides an 
analysis of the protection mechanisms provided by the processor architecture that could 
be used to enforce security policies. In addition, hardware features provided by the 
architecture that may make security policy enforcement difficult are discussed. 
C.       ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter II describes the security requirements (privilege bit, memory 
management, and restricted privilege) needed to build a robust and secure system. In 
addition, the protection mechanisms supported by the Intel x86 architecture are reviewed. 
Chapter DI gives an overview of the innovative features of IA-64 architecture 
such as speculation, predication, register rotation and the register stack engine. 
Additionally, important concepts regarding memory management and protection 
implemented by the processor architecture are explained (i.e. TLB organization and 
virtual addressing). 
Chapter IV gives a detailed description of the protection mechanisms supported 
by the IA-64 architecture. Four protection mechanisms provided by the architecture are: 
privilege levels, address space isolation, access rights and protection keys. 
Chapter V gives a summary of functional hardware protection features for 
protecting processes from each other and makes a comparison between MAS and SAS 
operating system modes. In addition, some challenges related to these architectural 
features are discussed. 
Chapter VI summarizes the previous chapters and provides a conclusion for the 
thesis. 
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II.      SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF A SYSTEM 
A.       CONCEPTS FOR BUILDING A SECURE SYSTEM 
As computer architectures become more sophisticated, new applications and 
features that support the manipulation and storage of information emerge almost daily. 
Control of access to stored information is a critical issue, as multiple system users should 
not necessarily be able to access all stored data, (e.g., a manager may need to access 
confidential information which is not made available to company employees). Thus, the 
computer itself, in order to protect sensitive information, should be able to support 
mechanisms that limit access to a company's confidential files. 
Information protection within a computer system can be defined as the security 
techniques that control access to stored information by each currently executing process. 
A process can be defined as a program's living space; that is a running program plus any 
state needed to continue running the program. The goal of a secure system is to prevent 
any unauthorized use of information. Unauthorized access to resources of a system is not 
possible if the secure operating system works, as it should. Users should not be able to 
penetrate the operating system in order to circumvent security policy. To achieve 
protection in operating systems, three major concepts are introduced: status information, 
memory management and restricted privilege [Ref. 17, 10]. 
To achieve the first concept, a status flag or privilege bits is used to allow the 
system to work in different privilege modes. These bits permit the system to distinguish 
between operating system and user modes. In a system that provides protection, there 
should be at least two modes: system mode and a user mode. This is required since the 
operating system should protect itself from users and must have a means of 
distinguishing privileged from non-privileged execution sequences. The following 
architectures are the examples of such systems supporting different modes of operation; 
Intel x86: two-status bits (four modes) 
Motorola 68000 family: one status bit (two modes: user and supervisor) 
The second concept requires that a user process be able to use a portion of the 
CPU state but it should not be allowed to write or modify it [Ref. 9]. This is achieved 
using base/bound registers and user/supervisor mode bit(s). User processes need to be 
prevented from writing this state because if they could, the operating system would not 
have complete control over users' processes. Without this mechanism, a user process 
might change the address range checks and modify another process' address space. 
The simplest hardware protection mechanism that controls exactly which part of 
the memory is accessible is called a descriptor register. This register contains two 
components: a base value and a bound value. Here, the base value represents the lowest 
numbered address that the program may use, and the bound value represents the number 
of locations beyond the base that may be used [Ref. 10]. User programs are not permitted 
to load or change descriptor registers. However, the operating system must be able to 
change these values so that it can switch between processes. This is achieved by 
implementing a privilege bit in the processor as described before. This prevents user 
programs  from  loading the  descriptor register  and  isolation  among processes  is 
accomplished. A supervisor program runs with the privilege state bit 'ON', and controls 
the use of some special instructions called privileged instructions. Privileged instructions 
include   operations   such   as   input-output   and   memory   management.   Since  these 
6 
instructions might have an effect on certain system registers, user programs must not 
execute them. Whenever a user program tries to execute a privileged instruction, program 
control is transferred to the supervisor program via traps or interrupts and the execution 
of such instructions is performed by the operating system. Supervisor programs are 
always allowed to turn the privileged state bit 'OFF' and transfer control to user 
programs. 
Virtual memory provides a different approach to memory management. The most 
crucial use of virtual memory is to support address spaces that are larger than the physical 
memory. Virtual memory describes methods that give processes more memory than is 
physically available, or that make the computer appear to have more memory than is 
physically available. Since there are multiple processes running in the system, each with 
its own address space, it would be unreasonable to allocate a full physical memory 
address space for each process. "Here, there should be a way of sharing a smaller amount 
of physical memory between processes. One way to do this, virtual memory, divides 
physical memory into blocks and allocates them to different processes" [Ref. 9]. With 
virtual memory, the CPU produces virtual addresses that are later translated to physical 
addresses at runtime, which may be used to access main memory. In this approach, there 
should be a protection mechanism that restricts a process to its own address space. This 
will be explained in Section B. 
The third concept, which protects the state of the privileged mode, requires that 
the privileged instructions cannot be executed by user programs. Attempts to execute 
such instructions transfer control to the supervisor mode at a pre-defined entry point, 
generally referred to as the "trap," or "gate" [Ref. 10]. The return to user mode is like a 
subroutine return that restores the previous user/supervisor mode. 
In addition to all these protection mechanisms, the system should also be able to 
verify the claimed identity of a user. This mechanism is called authentication. 
Authentication mechanisms require that there be a match between something the system 
knows and something the user knows and/or possesses. The solution comes through the 
use of passwords. During the login procedure to a system, the password entered by the 
user is compared against the entries stored in a password file. Login will succeed if a 
valid password is entered. Otherwise, it will fail. In this scheme, the password file is a 
piece of information that must be strictly protected by the system. A common problem 
with passwords is that they authenticate the user to the computer system but not vice 
versa. To overcome this problem, a mechanism called trusted path is implemented in 
operating systems. A trusted path establishes a direct communication between two 
entities (user, program, or hardware) on a host. This communication provides the 
required properties so that it cannot be intercepted by another entity and so that the two 
entities can mutually authenticate. In the absence of a trusted-path mechanism, malicious 
software can masquerade as "trusted" software to the user or can masquerade as the user 
to the trusted function [Ref. 13]. 
B.       ESSENTIALS OF COMPUTER SECURITY 
Active entities operating on information on behalf of the system's users are called 
subjects. Subjects can also be considered to be the executing processes in a particular 
domain. The domain may be defined, in part, by the mode of the system. An information 
repository in a computer system that the subjects may access is called an object. "A 
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domain of a process is defined to be the set of objects which the process currently has the 
right to access according to each access mode" [Ref. 8]. Here, access modes represent the 
permissions such as read and write for describing the access control to a particular object. 
At the simplest level, a computer system consists of a processor, memory and 
input-output devices. Objects can be considered to be well-defined portions of memory 
within the system, such as segments. To be able to control the operations on each object, 
an access control mechanism is required. The abstract mechanism for this is provided by 
the Reference Monitor Concept. "The Reference Monitor is an abstraction that allows 
subjects to make references to objects, based on a set of current access authorizations" 
[Ref. 8]. The Reference Monitor makes references to an authorization database to ensure 
that policy is enforced on all subject attempts to access objects. In an audit trail, the 
Reference Monitor can record both granted and unauthorized access attempts. In this 
scheme, an authorization database identifies which subjects may access each stored 
object. The Reference Monitor implementation in a computer system must meet three 
requirements: completeness, isolation and verifiability [Ref. 8]. 
Completeness: The Reference Monitor must be invoked on every reference by a 
subject to an object. 
Isolation: The Reference Monitor and its database must be protected from 
unauthorized alteration. 
Verifiability: The Reference Monitor must be simple and understandable so that it 
can be completely analyzed to guarantee it performs its functions properly. 
To meet the reference monitor requirements to some extent, different types of 
hardware and software mechanisms are implemented in the systems. One such 
mechanism to isolate processes' address spaces from each other is the virtual memory 
model. Virtual memory systems can be categorized into two classes: those with fixed size 
blocks, called pages, and those with variable size blocks, called segments. As mentioned 
before, with virtual memory, the CPU addresses must go through a translation structure 
from virtual to physical addresses. This is very useful since it provides the opportunity 
for the hardware to protect processes from each other. The simplest way of 
accomplishing this is to add access permission flags to each page or segment. 
Today's architectures support page tables and fast address translation structures 
such as translation-lookaside buffers (TLBs) not only to store virtual to physical address 
translations but also to provide protection. The information for each page is called a page 
table entry (PTE). This entry is like a cache entry where a tag holds portions of the virtual 
address and the data portion of the page table entry holds a physical page number, and a 
protection field. When the page table entry is changed during context switches by the 
kernel for a virtual-to-physical address translation, that entry should be updated to change 
the protection information and to flush any hardware (i.e. TLB) that caches this 
information. With respect to context switches, there are two performance problems: first, 
the cost of translation lookaside buffer (TLB) misses caused by the address space change 
and second, the cost of saving and restoring state during TLB flushes. 
To avoid TLB flushes during context switches and to enable more efficient 
isolation between processes, the IA-64 architecture provides new mechanisms such as 
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tagging TLB entries with region identifiers (RIDs) and protection keys. This will be 
explained in detail in Chapter IV. 
C.       PROTECTION IN X86 
The Intel x86 architecture is of interest because the IA-64 can execute the full x86 
instruction set. The Intel Pentium (II, m, TV) is a 32-bit microprocessor that supports two 
different modes: real mode and protected mode. In protected mode, in addition to 
paging, there are segment registers that are used to index into special tables. These tables 
are the Global Descriptor Table (GDT), which is global to all tasks; the Local Descriptor 
Table (LDT), which is one per task with only one LDT active at a time; and the Interrupt 
Descriptor Table (IDT), which is used to direct, interrupts [Ref. 14]. Each of the tables 
contains descriptors and an 8-byte structure that maps a memory region using the 
following attributes: 
• Base address in memory 
• Limit (If the effective address (base plus offset) is greater than this limit, 
the processor aborts the instruction and generates a protection violation 
exception). 
• Control bits (present bit, granularity bit and 2-bit field privilege bits) 
• Descriptor type (code or data, read-only or read/write, executable, or a 
special system segment) 
A segment register contains a 13-bit index field, a 1-bit table description field 
(GDT/LDT), and a 2-bit protection level. Whenever a segment is addressed, the CPU 
checks the related descriptor and the control bits relating to that descriptor. If the required 
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control bits do not permit adequate access authorization for that particular operation, an 
exception is raised and control is transferred to the operating system for exception 
handling. 
As previously mentioned, segment register descriptors are placed in either the 
GDT or the LDT. If only the GDT were implemented in the system, any task would be 
able to load another task's descriptor from the GDT since a task must be given the right 
to access any descriptors in a GDT. Hence, the need for The Local Descriptor Tables 
(LDTs) and privilege levels is obvious [Ref. 14]. 
An LDT is built by the operating system whenever a task is loaded in memory. A 
system might have several LDTs at the same time, but only one of them (indicated by the 
LDT register) can be active at a time. Writing the LDT register is, of course, a privileged 
operation. 
Although LDTs are useful for isolating processes from each other, the use of 
LDTs by themselves still does not prevent a task from accessing arbitrary descriptors in 
the GDT. To prevent such an access, the Intel Pentium supports both ring mechanisms (0, 
1, 2, 3) that can be used collectively with LDT structures and a multiple descriptor 
aliasing feature. "Multiple Descriptor Aliasing" will be explained later in this chapter. 
Level 0, the most privileged, is used for kernel code and the system databases by the 
operating system, whereas Level 3, the least privileged, is used for applications. Each 
descriptor provides a descriptor privilege level (DPL) to specify the segment's privilege 
and it is the operating system's job to appropriately set the DPL of descriptors to prevent 
unauthorized accesses to segments. 
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A problem may arise if the operating system wants to write into a particular 
segment whose descriptor indicates that it is not writable. The solution comes through the 
use of multiple descriptors, which are used to provide different views of the same 
segment. Hence, the same segment may be viewed as a code segment by the applications 
and as a data segment by the operating system. This feature is called multiple descriptor 
aliasing and it is used to accomplish sharing between separate processes that are 
supposed to access a segment with different access rights. 
Another type of protection provided by the processor is a check of the offset 
field, which is used to prevent addressing beyond the segment's limit. If an attempt to 
address beyond the segment's limit is made, an exception is raised. This protection 
feature is useful for isolating processes from each other, since each process is limited to 
work on the segments in its address space. 
In addition to LDTs and DPLs, task state segments (TSSs) are implemented by 
the architecture to hold all the registers of a task during context switches. In a fashion 
similar to the local descriptor tables, only one TSS can be active at a time. The TSS is 
described by a descriptor that indicates the base address, size, protection and the type, 
which, in this case, is a TSS. The selector of the currently running TSS is held in a 
special register called the Task Switch Segment Register (TR). 
In spite of all the protection features explained above, without the use of a special 
gate mechanism, processor's behavior would still be ambiguous if a task with privilege 
level 3 seeks to execute code with a higher privilege level. In such cases, the task should 
make a call to the more privileged domain by using a special type of descriptor known as 
a call gate. The x86 architecture uses the DPL in the call gate to insure the invoker is 
13 
allowed to use the gate: the caller must be at least as privileged as the gate. It then 
switches to the privilege level indicated in the descriptor pointed to by the gate. Thus, an 
executing program must have enough privilege to use a call gate. For instance, if the call 
gate's privilege level is 1, only programs with privilege levels 0 and 1 can use the call 
gate [Ref. 14]. 
Call gates increase the task's privilege level while executing the program called 
through gate. However, it is possible to make a call to a less privileged segment if and 
only if the conforming bit field in the descriptor register is set. For instance, if a task 
executing in privilege level 1 calls a function in a segment with the conforming bit set 
and DPL 2, that function will execute at privilege level 1 during the call. 
D.       SUMMARY 
Thus far, three protection mechanisms needed to build a robust and secure system 
have been described. First, the system should support supervisor and user modes by 
employing ring mechanisms or privilege levels. An operating system should run with the 
most privilege to control system software and hardware, whereas the applications should 
run with the least privilege. In addition, only a supervisor program should be able to use 
privileged instructions that might affect the processor's state. Thus, if an attempt is made 
to execute a privileged instruction in a non-privileged state, program control is 
transferred to the supervisor mode and the execution of such instructions is dealt with by 
the operating system. 
The second mechanism requires that there be a controlled call, i.e. a well-defined 
entry point, to the more privileged function. This entry point is called a gate, and is 
initialized and controlled by the operating system, but at the same time used by the less 
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privileged elements within a task. Gates provide a secure method of privilege level 
transfer within a task by raising software interrupts to operating system functions. 
The third mechanism is to support protection by restricting tasks from accessing, 
modifying or deleting anything exclusive to another address space. To achieve this 
restriction, each task must be allocated a separate region and must confine itself to its 
own address space. Segmentation offers effective protection in terms of allocating a 
separate address space for each task. 
Another method to allocate a separate address space is called paging. The Intel 
x86 architecture provides a memory model that supports both segmentation and paging. 
Paging both supports segmentation's main advantages and offers a very large address 
space. In this scheme, each process has a very large address space that is composed of 
potentially thousands of pages, but only the pages in current use by the application must 
be in the actual memory. 
In the next chapter, I will explain how the IA-64 supports these three protection 
concepts by expanding the current architecture with new features and approaches. 
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III.    INTRODUCTION TO IA-64 ARCHITECTURE 
Today's microprocessors have certain features that limit their performance, such 
as mispredicted branches and memory latency. As the processor clock rates go up faster 
than cache and memory access speeds, a performance limitation is presented by the 
memory loads since there will be a long latency unless the data is already in the highest 
level cache. 
In order to overcome such performance limitations, the IA-64 architecture 
integrates many new features and techniques, including predication, speculation and 
explicit parallelism. Predication and speculation address problems relating to branches 
and memory latency and explicit parallelism enables the compiler to execute more 
instructions per clock cycle. 
In addition to these techniques and features, the IA-64's large register set (128 
integer registers, 128 floating point registers), helps to minimize the negative effects of 
hardware complexity by transferring some of this complexity to the software. In the IA- 
64 architecture, general registers, floating point registers and predicate registers can be 
rotated by the compiler loop optimization. 
The objective of this thesis is to present an analysis of the IA-64 processor's 
support for secure systems, and this chapter will give a brief overview of the innovations 
of IA-64 architecture. 
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A.       INNOVATIONS OF IA-64 ARCHITECTURE 
1.        Predication 
Traditional architectures typically suffer from mispredicted branches and the 
penalties incurred as a result of these misdirected branches. Conditional branches are 
difficult to execute since the processor must decide what instructions to fetch beyond a 
branch before it computes the condition for that branch. To mitigate such performance 
penalties, traditional processors use branch prediction and execute instructions while the 
branch direction and target are resolved. The processor speculates as to the outcome of 
the conditional and executes one sequence of the branch in advance. If the branch 
prediction is correct, the processor capitalizes on these speculatively executed 
instructions and there is a performance benefit. When the prediction is wrong, the 
processor must throw away all the speculatively executed instructions and must execute 
the correct set of instructions. To avoid such misdirected branches, the IA-64 provides a 
technique called predication that removes branching by using a predicate register. This 
feature transforms control flow dependency associated with conditional branching into a 
data dependency by making comparisons between the contents of the registers and 
writing the predicate registers based on the result of the comparisons. 
There are several types of comparisons in the IA-64 architecture. A "normal 
compare" is a Boolean instruction that makes a comparison, and sets the first predicate 
register (pi) to the result, and the second predicate register (p2) to the complement of that 
result. For example; 
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cmp.eq pi, p2 = rl, r2 
(pl)subr5= r9,rlO 
(p2) add r8 = r6, r7 
The compare instruction generates two predicates (pi, p2). If GR[rl] is equal to 
GR[r2], then the instruction will set pi to l(true) and p2 to 0 (false). This means that the 
sub instruction will execute whereas the add instruction does nothing in this case. 
The unconditional compare instruction differs from the conditional instruction as 
it writes 0 to both of its predicate registers if the qualifying predicate value is 0. If the 
qualifying predicate value is 1, then execution is exactly the same as for normal 
conditions. This compare instruction is used to remove "nested-if" conversions and 
enhances optimization [Ref. 3]. For example, consider the C code and the corresponding 
compiled code, 
The C code is: 
If(a>b)   { \\ block 1 
c + +; \\ block 2 
} else { 
d + = c; \\ block 3 
if(k==m)   { \\ block 3 
n + +;       \\ block 4 
} else { 
19 
p + = n;   \\ block 5 
The compiled code is: 
cmp.gt    pl,p2 = ra, rb 
(pi)   add re = re+1 
(p2)  add rd = rd, re 
(p2)  cmp.eq.unc p3, p4 = rm, rk 
(p3)   add rn = rn, 1 
(p4)   add rp = rp, rn 
If a is greater than b, the first compare instruction will set pi to 1, and p2 to 0 and 
the unconditional compare will set both p3 and p4 to 0 since the qualifying predicate, p2, 
is 0. In this schema, there will be no branch mispredictions since there are no branches. 
Three other types of comparisons, AND, OR and ANDOR, reduce execution 
cycles due to computations of complex branches, thereby helping to increase instruction 
level parallelism. 
2.        Speculation 
Memory latency is one of the biggest performance limitations in traditional 
architectures. Since memory speed is much slower than processor speed, the processor 
must load data from memory as early as possible to guarantee that the data is available 
when needed. To overcome memory latency problems, the IA-64 processor uses a 
technique called speculation to allow the compiler to schedule loads much earlier, even 
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before it is known that the data contained in these loads will be needed in the flow of the 
program. 
However, there are two problems in scheduling loads in advance. One of them is 
the unpredictability of address aliasing with prior store instructions. This means that a 
load instruction cannot be executed prior to a store instruction, because the store 
instruction might address the same memory location as the load instruction. Second, if 
the memory access fails, the load instruction should raise an exception, but the program 
does not actually know whether the flow of the program will need that load instruction 
[Ref. 3]. Thus, an exception should not be raised until it is clear that the program requires 
that instruction. For example, when a speculative load instruction is executed, if the 
memory access is successful then the value is put into the specified register as if it had 
been a regular load instruction. If the memory access fails, instead of raising an exception 
as would have occurred when a regular load instruction is executed, the speculative load 
instruction sets a deferral token in the target register. It is the compiler's responsibility to 
construct code that will examine the deferral token later and, if necessary, execute 
recovery code. This is useful because if a regular load instruction is used, the operating 
system has to be involved each time the memory access fails without knowing whether 
the load is actually needed. In contrast, in the case of a speculative load, the operating 
system is interrupted only if the load instruction is actually used. 
To bypass these two potential difficulties, the IA-64 employs two different types 
of speculation: control speculation and data speculation. 
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a.        Control Speculation 
IA-64 employs speculative load instructions (ld.s, Idf.s, ldfp.s) and 
speculative check instructions (chk.s) to address the execution of exceptions at the time 
control flow of the program requires them. In cases where a regular load instruction 
raises an exception when the memory access fails, the speculative load instruction sets a 
deferral token called the NaT (Not a Thing) bit in the target register [Ref. 3]. When the 
chk.s instruction is executed, the NaT bit in the target register is checked. If it is '1', the 
control flow of the program is directed to the recovery code where a regular load 
instruction is executed. A NaT bit of '0' indicates that the speculative load instruction 
succeeded, and no additional operation is performed. 
Load instructions can have as their targets either general purpose registers 
or floating point registers. For general registers, the deferral token is called a NaT bit. 
When floating point registers are addressed, the deferral token is called a NaTVal (Not a 
Thing Value) bit. Because of the addition of the deferral token, the actual length of 
general registers is considered to be 65 bits [Ref. 3]. Floating point registers are 82-bits 
long. In this case, NaTVal is the special encoding of these 82-bits. 
If more than one speculative instruction is used in the program, NAT and 
NaTVal bits corresponding to these loads propagate during arithmetic instructions, and 
are checked only once with a speculative check instruction as shown below [Ref 3]. 
Id8.s rl = [r5] 
ld8.s r2 = [r6] 
22 
subr4 = rl,r2 
(pi) br.cond label 
chk.s r3, recover 
b.        Data Speculation 
Data speculation is another type of speculation that eliminates the obstacle 
encountered when a load instruction is moved ahead of a store instruction (i.e., that the 
instructions might address the same space in the memory). To address this problem, the 
IA-64 employs advance load instructions (ld.a, ldf.a, ldfp.a), and a check load instruction 
(ld.c) at the original location in the code of the load to test to see if a store conflicted with 
the associated load instruction. Whenever an advance load (ld.a) instruction is executed, 
an entry is made on a special address table called an Advance Load Address Table 
(ALAT). "When a ld.a inserts the entry into the ALAT, it first checks for any existing 
entry with the same register number, and overwrites it, if found. Thus there can only be 
one entry in the ALAT for any given register. This entry is used to detect collisions with 
stores" [Ref. 3] 
ALAT consists of three fields: register number, physical address and the 
size of the load instruction. This mechanism is useful for finding possible collisions 
between stores and loads. When a store instruction is executed, a search with the physical 
address of the store instruction is started through the ALAT table, which makes a 
comparison with every load entry in the table. If a matching entry is found, the 
corresponding load instruction will be discarded from the ALAT table. Accordingly, 
when a check load (ld.c) instruction is executed, it will search for an entry for the load 
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instruction. If it finds the entry, then data speculation has succeeded. If a store instruction 
between ld.a and ld.c had modified the same memory address space, which the ld.a 
instruction loaded, that store would have removed the associated ALAT entry. In this 
case, ld.c instruction does a normal load and execution continues [Ref 3]. 
Another instruction called "Speculative Advanced Load," combines 
speculative load and advance load. This instruction is useful for detecting both load-store 
conflicts and deferred exceptions. Its application is the same as that of normal data 
speculation, however, the ALAT entry for the target register is discarded from the table if 
an exception is raised associated with the load instruction. 
3.        Register Rotation 
Loop optimization is one of the crucial performance criteria in today's 
architectures because of its ability to reduce code expansion and overcome overhead 
problems. "Branching takes time and since the compiler knows ahead of time what the 
branches are, many branches can be avoided by simply duplicating the code in the loop 
two, four, or even more times to reduce the number of branches and allow greater 
parallelism. This is called "unrolling" the loop and is supported in both IA-64 and RISC 
architectures" [Ref. 5]. The problem with this scheme is that the set of virtual registers 
that are duplicated must use a different set of physical registers to avoid possible 
collisions. Even though the IA-64 supports a large set of registers, these duplicate 
instructions may still cause a code expansion. 
To enhance loop optimization, the IA-64 implements a software register rotation 
mechanism which is applicable to general registers, floating point registers, and predicate 
registers. A register rotation base (RRB) field in the CFM (Current Frame Marker) 
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register holds the base value for renaming of registers, which provides every iteration 
with its own set of registers. This type of register renaming is called register rotation. In 
each rotation, register addresses will increase by one, (e.g., for register 55, the next 
rotation would use register 56). A special branch instruction (br.ctop) decrements the 
RRB value in the CFM register at the end of each iteration. 
Register Rotation is the base of modulo-scheduling (i.e. new iterations can be 
started before the last one has finished). Modulo scheduled loop execution, as shown in 
Figure 1, increases the parallelism by allowing multiple iterations to be overlapped and 
contains 3 code sections: Prolog, Kernel and Epilog. The prolog instructions fill the 
software pipeline. Software pipelining is analogous to hardware pipelining but is created 
in code by the compiler. The epilog instructions that terminate the loop drain the software 
pipeline and the kernel code starts and finishes one iteration as shown in Figure 2. "A 
predicate is assigned to each stage to control the activation of instructions in that stage. 
To support the pipelining effect of predicates and registers, a fixed sized area of the 
predicate and floating point register files (PR16-PR63 and FR32-FR127), and a 
programmable area of the general register file, are defined to rotate" [Ref. 1] 









ld2 stl br.ctop 1 
ld3 st2 br.ctop2 
ld4 st3 br.ctop3 
ld5 st4 br.ctop4 
so br.ctop;> 
Figure 1. Modulo-Scheduled Loop Execution Sequence 
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Figure 2. Schedule of Modulo-Scheduled Loop from [Ref. 3] 
4.        Register Stack Engine (RSE) 
In the IA-64 architecture, general registers are divided into two subsets. A static 
subset (GR-0 through GR-31) is visible to all processes. A stacked subset (GR-32 
through GR-127) is local to each process. The static subset must be saved and restored on 
context switches. The stacked subset is automatically saved and restored by the Register 
Stack Engine (RSE). "The Register Stack is implemented by renaming the register 
addresses as a side effect of procedure calls and returns" [Ref. 1]. By renaming the 
registers, there is no need to spill (store a register to memory) and fill (load a register 
from memory) the register contents to memory on subroutine calls and returns. The callee 
can use available registers without spilling and restoring the caller's registers. 
The registers in a stacked subset are called a register stack frame. The frame is 
further divided into two parts: a local area and an output area. After a call, the size of the 
local area of the new frame is set to zero and the size of the output area is set to the size 
of the caller's output area. The local and output areas can be resized by using the alloc 
instruction [Ref. 2]. Figure 3. shows the register stack behavior on procedure call and 
return. 
"The IA-64 register stack engine moves registers between register stack and the 
backing store in memory without explicit program intervention. The backing store is 
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designed as a stack in memory and a special register called Backing Store Pointer (BSP) 
contains the address of the first memory location reserved for the current frame (i.e. the 
location at which GR32 of the current frame will be spilled)" [Ref. 2]. Another register 
associated with the RSE, called the BSPSTORE, contains the address at which the next 
RSE spill will occur. 
Instruction Execution 
Caller's Frame (procA) 
Callee's Frame (procB) 
After call 
Callee's Frame (procB) 
After alloc 
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Figure 3. Register Stack Behavior on Procedure Call and Return from [Ref. 2] 
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B.        IA-64 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE FEATURES 
1. Support For Multiple Address Space (MAS) Operating Systems 
In multiple address space operating systems, process isolation is enforced among 
processes by allocating a separate address space for each process. The IA-64 employs 
region identifiers (RIDs) to distinguish between different address spaces. 
In the IA-64 architecture, a 64-bit virtual address space consists of 3 fields: 
Virtual Region Number (VRN), Virtual Page Number (VPN), and Page Offset [Ref. 2]. 
The upper three bits of the 64 bit virtual address space selects one of the eight 
region registers. Each register contains a 24 bit RED. Using these identifiers, an operating 
system can map up to 224 virtual regions. Regions are used to share data between 
processes by loading the same RID into the region registers of multiple processes. Each 
process can have up to eight region identifiers. 
2. Support for Single Address Space (SAS) Operating Systems 
Single Address Space (SAS) operating systems allocate only one large virtual 
address space for all processes. They are useful for large multiprocessor systems, since 
data sharing between processes is more efficient than between multiple address space 
systems. 
"In a single address space system, protection keys permit domain granular access 
to a page. This is useful for mapping shared code and data segments in a globally shared 
region, and for implementing domains in a single address space (SAS) operating system" 
[Ref. 2]. Unlike multiple address space systems, the single address space systems extends 
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the virtual address space to 285 bytes since the 24 bit region identifiers are considered to 
be the upper bits of the global address space. 
C.       IA-64 EXECUTION ENVIROMENT 
1. General Registers (GRs) 
IA-64 employs 128 (gr0-grl27) general purpose registers for integer 
computations. Although each of these registers is 64 bits long, the additional NaT bit that 
is used to raise exceptions can be considered as the 65   bit. 
General registers 0 through 31 are called static general registers. These registers 
are used during procedure calls and are preserved by callers and callees at all privilege 
levels. GRO always reads zero if addressed as a source operand, and writing to this 
register causes an illegal operation fault. 
General registers 32 through 127 are called stacked general registers, and these 
registers are local to each process. The stacked registers allocated to a particular process 
are called a register stack frame, and they can be renamed for loop optimization purposes. 
2. Floating Point Registers (FRs) 
In addition to general registers, the IA-64 also employs 128 (fr0-frl27) 82 bit 
floating point registers. Floating point registers 0 through 31 are called static floating 
point registers. Of these registers, FRO always reads +0.0 and FR1 always reads +1.0. 
Neither of these registers can be used as a destination register, otherwise a fault is raised 
[Ref. 1]. 
Registers from 32 to 127 are called rotating floating point registers, and can be 
renamed for "Modulo-scheduled loop support" [Ref. 1]. 
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3. Predicate Registers (PRs) 
The IA-64 provides 64 (pr0-pr63) 1 bit predicate registers to store the results of 
compare instructions. Predicate registers 0 through 15 are called static predicate registers, 
and are used for conditional execution (predication). 
Registers 16 through 63 are called the rotating predicate registers, and can be 
renamed for "Modulo-scheduled loop support" [Ref. 1]. 
4. Branch Formats (BRs) 
IA-64 employs 8 (br0-br7) 64 bit branch registers for indirect branches. There are 
two types branch formats used in the IA-64 architecture. One is called indirect branch 
format and uses branch registers to assign a value to the Instruction Pointer. The other, 
the IP relative branch format, does not use branch registers. In instances where the latter 
format is used, the instruction pointer is incremented by a 21-bit offset field [Ref. 1]. 
5. Instruction Pointer (IP) 
In the IA-64 architecture, three instructions are grouped together into 128-bit 
containers called bundles [Ref. 1]. A bundle consists of three instructions of 41 bits each 
and a template field of 5 bits. Each instruction occupies the first, second, or third syllable 
of a bundle. The IA-64 provides six types of instructions and four types of excution units 
(instruction, memory, floating point, and branch). The template field is used by the 
processor to quickly decode the bundle, and issue the instructions to the execution units. 
This field also restricts the instruction combinations in a bundle. The Instruction Pointer 
(IP) holds the address of the currently executing bundle. The contents of the IP change as 
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instructions are executed. This register cannot be written directly, and can only be read by 
the privileged mov ip instruction. 
6.        Current Frame Marker (CFM) 
When a function call (br.call) is made, the 38 bit Current Frame Marker (CFM) is 
copied to the previous frame marker field of the Previous Function State Register (PFS). 
The current frame marker is then assigned to a new value with a set of output registers 
known as the caller's output registers, and all register rename base registers (RRBs) are 
subsequently assigned to '0'. The Frame Marker Format is shown in Figure 4 and the 
fields are described in Table 1. 
rrb.pr rrbir rrb.gr sor sol sof 







Size of stack frame 
sol 
7:13 
Size of local portion 
of stack frame 
SOT 14:17 Size of rotating portion 
of stack frame 
rrb.gr 18:24 Register Rename Base for general registers 
rrb.fr 25:31 Register Rename Base for floating point registers 
rrb.fr 32:37 Register Rename Base for predicate registers 
7. 
Table 1. Frame Marker Description Fields from [Ref. 1] 
Application Registers (ARs) 
Application Registers consist of special data registers and control registers for 
both the IA-32 and IA-64 instruction sets are shown in figure 5. 
a.        Kernel Registers (KRO-7) 
IA-64 provides eight 64-bit kernel registers that direct information from 
the operating system to the application. When the privilege bit is not zero, writes to these 
























































































Figure 5. Application Register Set from [Ref. 2] 
b.        Register Stack Configuration Register (RSC) 
The Register Stack Configuration Register controls the IA-64 Register 
Stack Engine (RSE). "Two mode bits field in the RSC register determine when the RSE 
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generates register spill or fill operations" [Ref. 1]. Instructions that change the contents of 
this register can not set the current process's privileged level to a more privileged level. 
c. RSE Backing Store Pointer (BSP) 
The IA-64 employs a 64-bit RSE Backing Store Pointer to designate the 
address space in memory for the current frame [Ref. 1]. See " Register Stack Engine 
(RSE)" in Section A. 
d. RSE Backing Store Pointer for Memory Stores (BSPSTORE) 
The BSPSTORE application register provides the address space where the 
next RSE spill will occur. See " Register Stack Engine (RSE)" in Section A. 
e. RSE NaT Collection Register (RNA T) 
A 64-bit RSE NaT Collection Register is used to collect NaT bits 
whenever RSE spills a register to the Backing Store in memory [Ref. 1]. 
/. Compare and Exchange Value Register (CCV) 
This application register is used to hold the compare value for compare and 
exchange (cmpxchg) instruction [Ref. 1]. 
g. User NaT Collection Register (UNAT) 
A 64-bit UNAT register is used by ld8.fill and st8.spill instructions to hold 
NaT bits [Ref. 1]. 
h.        Floating Point Status Register (FPSR) 
FPSR provides information and control for floating point operations such 
as traps, flags, overflows and rounding control [Ref. 1]. 
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i. Interval Time Counter (ITC) 
64-bit ETC register is used for timing. It is incremented at a submultiple of 
the processor clock frequency. ITC can be secured by software from non-privileged 
accesses and can only be written at the highest privilege level 0 [Ref. 1]. 
j. Previous Function State (PFS) 
The Previous Function State Register consists of five fields: Previous 
Privilege Level (ppl); Previous Epilog Count (pec); Previous Frame Marker (pfm); and 
two reserved fields. On a subroutine call (br.call), CFM, EC and PSR.cpl (current 
privilege level in the Processor Status Register) are directly copied to the PFS Register, 
and the old contents are discarded. " When an IA-64 br.ret instruction is executed, the 
PFS is copied to the CFM and PFS .ppl is copied to PSR.cpl, unless this action would 
increase the privilege level" [Ref. 1]. The Previous Function State Register is saved and 
restored during context switches. 
k.        Loop Count Register (LC) 
A 64-bit Loop Count Register is used in IA-64 counted loops. Traditional 
architectures use branch history to predict the next outcome. If the branch was taken 
more than once or twice, it will always be predicted taken next time. In this scheme, the 
last iteration of a loop will always be mispredicted. This creates a problem where loops 
are to execute a small number of iterations, since the branch prediction mispredicts the 
last iteration everytime [Ref. 3]. To overcome this limitation, the IA-64 provides a special 
register (LC) and an instruction (cloop) for loop closing branches. The compiler 
generates an instruction that assigns the number of iterations to the LC register. The loop 
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The loop closing branch instruction (cloop) checks the value in the LC register. If the 
value is zero, then the next instruction in the sequence is executed. If the value is not 
zero, then the LC register is decremented by one and a new iteration starts from the 
beginning of the loop [Ref. 3]. 
/. Epilog Count Register (EC) 
A 6-bit Epilog Count Register is used to count the termination stages of 
Modulo-Scheduled Loops [Ref. 1]. 
m.       Performance Monitor Data Register (PMD) 
Performance Monitor Registers provide values from the monitors and are 
useful for operating systems and system performance. Writes to these registers are 
allowed only at the most privileged level whereas reads are allowed at all privilege levels 
[Ref. 1]. 
D.       IA-64 VIRTUAL ADDRESSING 
IA-64 architecture provides a 64 bit virtual address space that is divided into 8 
virtual regions. Each virtual region can be selected by the upper three bits of the virtual 
address. Each of the eight virtual regions contains a 24 bit region identifier (RID) which 
can be mapped by the operating system onto the system's 224 virtual regions. RIDs help 
translation lookaside buffers (TLB) hold translations from many address spaces at the 
same time [Ref. 2]. See "Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB)" 
A single virtual address consists of three fields: Virtual Region Number (VRN), 
Virtual Page Number (VPN) and Page Offset as shown in Figure 6. When memory is 
accessed, the VRN selects the region identifier from one of the eight region registers 
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under operating system control and then a search is initiated through the TLB for the 
matching RID and VPN. If there is a matching entry in the TLB, the associated physical 
page number is concatenated with the page offset to form the physical address. If the 
entry is not found in the TLB, an optional search can be initiated through the memory 
resident virtual hash page table (VHPT). If the entry is not found either in the TLB or the 
VHPT, an exception is raised and the operating system provides the necessary translation 
[Ref. 2]. The general order of searching the TLB and VHPT is shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 6. Virtual Address Spaces from [Ref. 6]. 
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Figure 7. TLB/VHPT Search from [Ref. 2] 
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1.        Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) 
Similar to most architectures, the IA-64 provides translation lookaside buffers 
(TLBs) that are local to each processor. These buffers hold recent virtual to physical page 
translations. There are two architectural TLBs maintained by the processor: the 
instruction (ITLB) and data (DTLB). Further, each TLB is divided into two subsets called 
translation registers (TRs) and translation caches (TCs) that are used to hold different 











Figure 8. TLB Organization from [Ref. 2] 
The 24 bit region identifier and virtual page number (33-49 bits) of the virtual 
address are used to look up TLB entries. At the end of the TLB lookup, the physical page 
number and access privileges are generated for a TLB hit. Memory protection on the 
basis of access rights, privilege levels and protection keys are supported by the processor 
as shown in Figure 9. See Chapter IV for details. 
Translation registers managed by software are basically used to map large and 
static virtual memory translations such as kernel memory spaces, page tables and 
interrupt vector tables. Translation register slots are filled according to register numbers 
by using the insert translation register (itr.i, itr.d) instructions at the highest privilege 
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level. Once a translation entry is inserted into a TR slot, it will remain there unless it is 
overwritten by software or it is purged. 
Two address translations are said to overlap when one or more of the same virtual 
addresses are mapped by both translations. In this context, "overlap" refers to two 
translations with the same region identifier. Software must check all TR entries to make 
sure that there are no overlapping translation before filling a TR slot. Otherwise, either 
undefined behavior or an exception occurs. 
Translations are removed from the TRs by specifying a virtual address, page size 
and a region identifier that are used as parameters by the purge translation register 
(ptr.i/ptr.d) instructions. 
There should be a minimum of 8 instruction and 8 data TR slots implemented in 
software for a particular process. Translation registers support all implemented page sizes 
and are not directly readable. 
Translation caches (TCs) use the same format as TRs, but can be managed by 
both software and hardware. The hardware management of translation caches is achieved 
when the VHPT walker is enabled for a translation after a failed TLB search. In this case, 
if the required translation is found in the VHPT, it is installed into the translation cache 
that resides in the TLB used by the VHPT walker. In addition, TCs are used to hold 
smaller and more dynamic translations. TC slots are also filled by using insert translation 
cache (itc.i, itc.d) instructions. Insertions always purge overlapping entries. 
There are three types of purge instructions used for translation caches. The most 
common type is the local TC purge instruction (ptc.l). It is used to remove translation 
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cache entries in the local processor TLBs that match a specified virtual address range and 
region identifier [Ref 2]. 
In order to purge all entries from the local processor's instruction translation 
cache (ITC) and data translation cache (DTC), software uses a series of purge translation 
cache entry (ptc.e) instructions. The IA-64 uses purge translation cache global (ptc.g, 
ptc.ga) instructions to purge translation cache (TC) entries matching a specified virtual 
address and a region identifier from all processors in a TLB coherence domain. A TLB 
coherence domain represents a group of processors that is on the same bus in a 
multiprocessor system. These instructions obviate the need for performing inter-processor 
interrupts to maintain TLB coherence in a multi-processor system [Ref. 2]. 
The Ptc.g and ptc.ga instructions present a release operation; all memory 
references prior to the ptc.g instruction are made visible to all procedures before the ptc.g 
is executed. Even though use of the ptc.ga instruction is almost identical to a ptc.g 
instruction, the ptc.g instruction does not modify the page tables nor any other memory 
location. However, the ptc.ga instruction removes any Advance Load Address Table 
(ALAT) entries that are in the address range specified for the ptc.ga instruction from all 
processors' ALATs. This task is performed to ensure that old ALAT entries are discarded 
whenever a translation is remapped to a different physical address. 
All processor models should support a minimum number of 1 instruction and 1 
data translation cache register. In some cases, unused TR slots can be used for TC entries 
by the processor. 
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2.        Virtual Hash Page Table (VHPT) 
IA-64 provides a per processor base structure called a Virtual Hash Page Table to 
enhance the performance of the TLB. VHPT resides in virtual memory and can be 
searched by the processor. Figure 10 shows Virtual Hash Page Table configuration. If a 
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TLB miss occurs, the processor searches the VHPT for a matching entry by enabling the 
VHPT walker. If the matching entry is found in the table, the hardware tablewalker 
inserts the entry into the translation cache (TC). If additional TLB misses occur during 
the VHPT search, a VHPT translation fault is raised. If the entry is not found in both the 
TLB and VHPT, a VHPT Fault or a TLB Miss Fault is raised. A more detailed view of 
TLB/VHPT search is shown in Figure 7. "Operating system must regard the VHPT 
walker as a performance optimization and must be prepared to handle TLB misses if the 
walker fails" [Ref. 2]. 
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The VHPT can be designed in two different ways, as a linear page table or as a 
hashed page table. The linear page table uses 8-byte page table entries (PTEs), and is 
indexed only by the virtual page number (VPN). This format is used with applications 
running on Multiple Address Space (MAS) operating systems, and can not use protection 
keys due to the insufficient number of page table entry (PTE) bits for the keys. In this 
scheme, the per region page table is in the same address space as the actual virtual 
address being translated. 
An alternative page table format is called a hashed page and uses 32-byte PTEs. 
This format employs protection keys for data sharing and access control purposes, and is 
used with applications running on Single Address Space (SAS) operating systems. In this 
format, the hash function is embedded in hardware. The long format VHPT is useful for 
sparsely populated address spaces since the short format VHPT has a linear layout and 
would consume a large amount of memory [Ref. 2]. 
E.       CONTEXT MANAGEMENT IN THE IA-64 
Intel's IA-64 manual [Ref. 2] states context management and state preservation 
rules as follows; 
1.        User Level Thread Switch 
2]- 
The following steps need to be taken to execute a user level thread switch [Ref. 
• The caller saves GRs 2-3, GRs 8-11, GRs 14-15, Grs 16-31, FRs 6-15 and 
FRs 32-127. 
• The callee saves GRs 4-7, FRs 2-5 and FRs 16-31 
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• GRs 32-127 are preserved by the Register Stack Engine (RSE) 
• GR 0 is always zero. FR 0 is always +0.0 and FR1 is always +1.0. 
• GR 1, GR 12 and GR13 have special uses. 
• Preserve predicate, branch, and application registers. 
• Flush outgoing register stack to backing store, and switch to incoming 
thread's backing store. 
• Switch thread memory stack pointers. 
• Restore incoming thread's predicate, branch, and application registers. 
• Restore incoming thread's preserved register state. 
2.        Thread Switches Within The Same Address Space 
When the operating system switches between different threads in the same 
address space, the following steps should be followed [ref. 2]: 
• Application architecture state (GRs, FRs, PRs, BRs, ARs) associated with 
each thread are saved and restored. This is described in "User Level Thread Switch" in 
Section E.l. 
• Memory ordering operations are performed. The IA-64 requires a memory 
synchronization (sync.i) and a memory fence (mf) during a context switch to ensure that 
all memory operations prior to the context switch are made visible before the context 
changes. 
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3.        Address Space Switching 
When the operating system switches the address space, it is necessary that the 
same steps as in the thread switch be preformed [Ref. 2]. Additionally, operating system 
is required to take following steps: 
• Save the contents of the protection key registers (PKRs) corresponding to 
the outgoing process, and then invalidate the protection key registers. 
• Default Control Register (DCR) of the outgoing address space is saved. 
The DCR specifies default parameters for Processor Status Register values 
on interruption. 
• Region Registers (RRs) of the outgoing address space are saved. 
• Region Registers (RRs) of the incoming address space are restored. 
• DCR of the incoming address space is restored. 
• PKRs of the incoming address space are restored 
F.        SUMMARY 
As described in this chapter, the IA-64 processor provides many new 
architectural features. The innovative use of predication and speculation allows the 
processor to overcome the limitations of mispredicted branches and memory latency 
problems whereas register rotation provides increased loop performance over traditional 
architectures. In addition, this chapter has focused on some architecture features such as 
virtual addressing schemes, execution environments, TLB based protection mechanisms 
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and context management. Chapter IV provides a detailed description of protection 
mechanisms supported by the architecture. In Chapter V, the security challenges related 
to these new features will be examined. 
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IV.    PROTECTION IN THE IA-64 
The IA-64 architecture provides many protection mechanisms to enforce security 
mechanisms among processes. These features are: privilege levels, access rights, isolation 
of processes into separate address spaces and protection keys. Privilege levels, access 
rights, and protection key-based memory protection mechanisms are embedded into the 
translation lookaside buffer (TLB) mechanism supported by the processor architecture. 
This chapter will describe each of these mechanisms and then outline the translation 
lookaside buffer support provided by the IA-64. 
A.       PRIVILEGE LEVELS 
The IA-64 processor supports four different privilege levels (0 to 3) to control 
access to memory address spaces, system instructions and system registers. Level 0 
represents the most privileged level whereas level 3 is the least privileged one. In this 
hierarchy, privileged instructions and registers can only be accessed in the most 
privileged level. When attempts to access privileged elements of the processor are made 
by unauthorized privilege levels, a Privilege Operation Fault is raised. Each memory 
access compares the current privilege level of the process with that of the target resource. 
The current privilege level (CPL) field of the Processor Status Register (PSR) provides 
the current privilege level of the executing process to the processor. The CPL field can 
only be modified by the operating system due to interrupts, the break instruction 
(break/rfi) and the enter privilege code instruction (epc/br.ret). See "Privilege Level 
Transfer" in section B. 
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On each memory access, the current privilege level of the executing process is 
obtained from the PSR and compared with the privilege level of the associated page 
given by the TLB entry (TLB.pl) for that page. If the current privilege level is less than or 
equal to the privilege level defined in the TLB, access is permitted. Further, the type of 
the access (i.e read, write, execute) is obtained from the "access rights" field of the TLB 
entry (TLB.ar). See "Access Rights" in section C. 
B.       PRIVILEGE LEVEL TRANSFER 
As mentioned in Chapter II, privilege level transfer between processes must only 
be made through controlled entry and exit points that are strictly managed by the 
operating system. Otherwise, processes in different privilege levels can modify each 
other's address spaces and intra-process leakage becomes inevitable. The IA-64 provides 
two instructions that may cause a privilege level transfer: the break instruction (break/rfi) 
and the enter privilege code instruction (epc/br.ret). 
The break instruction, usually paired with return from interruption (rfi), causes a 
Break Instruction Fault that is used to change privilege levels. "When the break 
instruction is executed, it branches to the Break Fault Handler, which should be a valid 
address mapping in the privileged mode for each user application, and raises the 
privileged mode to the most privileged level" [Ref. 2]. The break instruction also 
contains a 21-bit immediate value that is passed to the corresponding fault handler to 
differentiate system calls from some other usage of the break instruction (such as 
debugging). The return from interruption (rfi) instruction is used to return from the fault 
handler to the previous mode. 
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On the other hand, the enter privilege code instruction (epc) increases the current 
privilege level without an interrupt or a control flow transfer. Some execute-only kernel 
pages, also known as promotion pages, have a higher privilege level specified in their 
TLB entries. To make a system call with the epc instruction, a user system branches to an 
execute-only kernel page (TLB.ar7) controlled by the operating system, using a branch 
call instruction (br.call). At this point, the epc instruction is executed in the kernel page to 
raise the current privilege level to a higher privilege level. After the epc instruction is 
executed, the current privilege level (PSRcpl) is raised to the privilege level of the 
promotion page that is specified by the TLB entry and the next instructions are executed 
at the target privilege level. To return back to user mode, the kernel executes a branch 
return (br.ret) instruction. " The br.ret instruction demotes the privilege level, by restoring 
the privilege level contained within the Previous Function State (PFS) application 
register. To ensure operating system integrity, the epc instruction checks that the previous 
privilege level field in the Previous Function State register (PFS.ppl) is no greater than 
the PSR.cpl at the time the epc is executed" [Ref.2]. 
As described earlier, execute-only pages (TLB.ar7) are used to promote the 
privilege level on entry into the operating system. Although, these promotion pages are 
controlled by the operating system, any application that has a lower privilege level than 
the promotion page can branch into these pages by executing a branch call (br.call) 
instruction. After the execution of the epc instruction, an application executing in 
privilege level 3 can be directly promoted to privilege level 0 bypassing the intermediate 
privilege levels 1 and 2. In the IA-64 architecture, there is no architectural hardware 
feature to prevent such promotions from bypassing these intermediate privilege levels. To 
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force the thread of execution to follow a privilege hierarchy restricts a malicious user 
from gaining unauthorized privilege by writing malicious code to circumvent system 
security mechanisms and jump right into the highest privilege level. Because the epc 
must be executed as the first instruction in the kernel page, it presents a well-defined 
control point on entry into the kernel page and prevents such exploitations. If the epc is 
not executed as the first instruction of a promotion page, the processor raises a privileged 
operation fault. 
C.       SEPARATE ADDRESS SPACES 
In the IA-64 architecture, virtual memory is a crucial feature of the operating 
system's protection mechanisms and multitasking support. The IA-64 can map a 264 byte 
virtual address space whereas traditional 32-bit architectures can only map up to a 232 
byte address space. Further, the memory space required by the page table entries is much 
larger than those in 32-bit processors and, hence, is conveniently placed in virtual 
memory. All of these combine to put more pressure on the processor's translation 
lookaside buffer (TLB). Thus, the IA-64 supports some new features not only to lessen 
the pressure on the TLB but also to provide efficient resource sharing while supporting 
required protection mechanisms. These features are: regions and region identifiers and 
protection key registers. 
1.        Regions 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the IA-64 provides a 64-bit virtual address space. The 
upper three bits of the virtual address select one of the eight region registers to which a 
particular address belongs. Each region register (RR), which is managed by the operating 
system, includes a region identifier (RID) associated with the region. RIDs may vary 
52 
from 18 to 24-bits in size depending on the implementation. This feature allows the 
operating system to be able to map from 218 up to 224 address spaces as shown in Figure 
5, Chapter DI. To make an address space visible to software, the operating system loads 
its region identifier into one of eight region registers. 
In Multiple Address Space (MAS) operating systems, where a separate address 
space is provided for each process, the RIDs are used as address identifiers. It is the 
operating system that assigns a unique region identifier to a process for a process-private 
region. In cases where a process requires more than one private region, the operating 
system can assign multiple unique RIDs to a process. 
Each translation entry in the TLB contains a RID associated with it. This feature 
eliminates the need to invalidate the entire TLB on a context switch as in traditional 
architectures. Historically, when a context switch is performed in such architectures, each 
page table entry and the protection information in the TLB related to the switched- 
process must be invalidated by the processor. In the IA-64 architecture, when a context 
switch is performed from process A to process B, the operating system removes only 
process A's private region identifiers from the CPU's region registers and swaps them 
with process B's region identifiers [Ref. 2]. If a region is to be shared by two processes, 
the region identifiers (RIDs) of the shared regions stay in place in the processor's region 
registers. In this case, data sharing and protection are achieved on the basis of privilege 
level (TLB.pl) and corresponding access rights (TLB.ar) fields in the TLB. For instance, 
if two processes with different privilege levels (process A=pl2 and process B=pl3) are 
supposed to share the same address space, first, the privilege level of each process is 
compared with the privilege level of the page in the TLB (TLB.pl). If the process's 
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privilege level is equal to or greater than the TLB.pl, access is granted to the page in 
physical memory. Further, the type of the access, such as read, write or execute, is 
attained from the access rights field in the TLB (TLB.ar). Table 2 shows "Access Rights" 
to a page. To be precise, assume that TLB.pl = 3 and TLB.ar = 4. Both processes are 
permitted to access the page and they can also read, write and execute on the page. See 
"Access Rights" in section C. In this scenario, it is not possible to enforce appropriate 
data sharing if the processes are to execute in different classification levels, (i.e. process 
A executes in Top Secret, process B executes in Unclassified) since they do not reach the 
page with different access rights. Instead, they are either denied access to the page 
according to their privilege levels or allowed to share the page with the same access 
rights if and only if they have the right privilege levels. In this scenario, regardless of the 
privilege levels that the processes are currently executing, it is not possible to assign 
different security levels (secret, unclassified) to these processes. The problem of 
providing different security levels is solved through the use of protection keys and 
protection key registers that are described in section D. 
In the IA-64 architecture, there is actually no "SAS operating system" or "MAS 
operating system" mode. The difference between the two operating system models is the 
encoded policy enforced by the operating system. In other words, the difference comes 
through the management of the region identifiers (REDs) and protection keys by the 
operating system. In a Single Address Space operating system, multiple processes can 
share data by using the same RID and the protection is enforced by the operating system 
using protection keys. In a MAS operating system, per-process RIDs enforce per process 
protection and isolation [Ref. 2]. 
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On the other hand, Hybrid SAS/MAS models that combine unique REDs for per 
process regions and shared RIDs with protection keys for per-page memory protection in 
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Table 2. Access Rights from [Ref. 2] 
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D. ACCESS RIGHTS 
As mentioned before, the IA-64 supports four privilege levels to control access to 
pages. Page access is determined by the TLB.ar, and TLB.pl fields and by the privilege 
level of the access. On memory accesses, the privilege level of the currently executing 
process is obtained from the Processor Status Register (PSR.cpl), and is compared with 
the privilege level of the related page (TLB.pl). Along with the result of the comparison 
and the access right field of the TLB (TLB.ar), the type of the access is obtained. Table 2 
shows "Access Rights" to a page. Within the table, "—"means no access, "R" means 
read access, "W" means write access, "X" means execute access, and "Pn" means 
promote PSR.cpl to "n" whenever the enter privilege code (epc) instruction is executed" 
[Ref. 2]. Here, "n" represents target privilege level specified by the promotion page. 
Software can verify page level permissions by executing the probe instruction. 
This instruction is used to check accessibility to a specific virtual page by verifying both 
privilege levels and page level and protection key permissions. 
E. PROTECTION KEYS 
There are two different types of protection mechanisms provided by the IA-64 
that may be used to mediate access to a page. As described earlier, the first one is the 
page access rights bits in the TLB associated with each translation. This protection 
mechanism provides privilege level-granular access to a page. The second mechanism is 
the protection keys that allow domain-granular access to a page. Domains are defined by 
protection key registers and offer an efficient method for the operating system to control 
access rights to groups of pages. "These keys are especially useful for mapping shared 
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code and data segments in a globally shared region, and for implementing domains in a 
single address space (SAS) operating system" [Ref. 2]. 
The Protection Key Registers (PKR) represent a register cache of all protection 
keys required by a process. Management and replacement policies for this cache are 
determined by the operating system. All IA-64 processors employ at least 16 protection 
key registers (PKRs) that contain 18 to 24-bit protection keys depending on the 
implementation. To enable the protection key check, the protection key bit in the 
Processor Status Register (PSR.pk) must be set to '1'. This way, all the memory 
references are directed to go through protection key checks during the virtual-to-physical 
address translations. Figure 11 and Table 3 describe the protection key register format 
and protection key register fields respectively. 
When protection key checking is enabled, the protection key tagged to a 
translation is checked against all protection keys in the protection key register cache 
before a memory access is permitted [Ref. 2]. Here, tagged translation defines a 
protection key attached to an entry in the TLB. If a matching key is found, the access 
rights (i.e wd, rd, xd) determined by the key are applied to the translation. If the access 
being performed is allowed by the matching key and the TLB.ar field, access is granted 
to the page. Otherwise, a Protection Key Permission Fault is raised by the processor and 
the operating system may either terminate the program or grant it the requested access 
[Ref. 2]. The protection key register's access denials always override TLB access rights. 
For instance when 'wd' is set by the in protection key register, 'write' permission is 
denied to translations even if the TLB access rights permit the write. If the matching key 
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is not found, a Protection Key Miss Fault is raised by the processor, and the operating 
system must insert the correct protection key into PKRs and retry the access. 
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Figure 11. Protection Key Register Format from [Ref. 2] 
Field Bits Description 
V 0 Valid - When 1, the Protection Register entry is valid 
and is checked by the processor when performing protection 
checks. When 0, the entry is ignored. 
wd 1 Write Disable - When 1, write permission is denied to 
translations in the protection domain. 
rd 2 Read Disable - When 1, read permission is denied to 
translations in the protection domain. 
xd 3 Execute Disable - When 1, execute permission is denied 
translations in the protection domain. 
key 31:8 Protection Key - uniquely tags translation to a given protection domain. 
rv 7:4, 63:32 reserved 
Table 3. Protection Registers Fields from [Ref. 2] 
Protection key insertion into the protection key registers is performed with the 
move to PKR instruction. During the execution of this instruction, the processor checks 
the new valid protection key against all protection key registers to guarantee the 
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uniqueness of the key. If a valid matching key is found in any of the PKR registers, the 
processor invalidates the matching PKR that exists in the cache by setting PKR.v bit to 
zero. The other fields in the matching PKR remain unchanged when it is invalidated. 
Protection keys can be read from the processor's data TLBs by executing the tak 
instruction. However, instruction TLB key values can not be read directly. These values 
must be held in software-maintained data structures [Ref. 2]. 
F.        SUMMARY 
Thus far, protection requirements to build a secure system have been explained in 
Chapter II. This chapter has focused on the protection mechanisms in the IA-64 
architecture to meet these requirements. 
The first concept, that requires the implementation of privilege levels or ring 
mechanisms, is evidently supported by the processor. As mentioned before, the IA-64 
supports four different privilege levels (0 to 3) to control access to memory address 
spaces, system instructions and system registers. Further, when attempts to access 
privileged elements of the system are made by unauthorized privilege levels, a Privilege 
Operation Fault is raised by the processor. 
As explained in Chapter II, the second concept indicates that there should be a 
non-bypassable controlled call or a well defined entry point to a more privileged function. 
By implementing two special instructions; the break and the enter privilege code (epc), 
the IA-64 architecture increases the current privilege level to a higher privilege level via 
controlled entry points. Of these instructions, the epc increases the current privilege level 
without an interrupt or a control flow transfer. Alternatively, the break instruction 
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branches to the Break Fault Handler as in traditional architectures and then can raise the 
privileged mode to the most privileged level. 
The third concept is to support protection by restricting tasks from accessing, 
modifying or deleting anything exclusive to another address space. To achieve this 
restriction, each task must be allocated a separate region, managed by the more privileged 
operating system that defines the process address space. The IA-64 provides a paging 
structure to apply protection to pages. In a multiple address space operating system 
(MAS), each process is placed within a unique address space. Region identifiers tag 
virtual address mappings to a given process. Associated with each translation, there is an 
access rights field in the TLB that provides privilege-level granular access to the page. In 
a single address space system (SAS), processes exist within a global virtual address space 
and protection among processes is enforced through protection key registers. In both 
operating system models, the translation lookaside buffer (TLB) structure implemented 
by the processor establishes the base for protection algorithms. 
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V.      SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE IA-64 ARCHITECTURE 
Thus far, three major requirements for a secure system have been discussed. 
Further, the ways in which the IA-64 architecture supports these requirements have been 
explained. This chapter will compare the support provided by the hardware and contrast it 
with that provided by software to meet these requirements. In addition, security 
challenges related to some architectural features will be examined. 
A secure computing system must be able to enforce security policies reliably, 
even in worst-case scenarios. Protection mechanisms that support these policies are 
implemented in a computer's operating system and hardware. Although software is the 
primary focus of the attention, hardware components are obviously critical to a system's 
security. Indeed, hardware security features are an indispensable part of the 
implementation. Hardware components are often designed with an incomplete 
understanding of security issues and, as a result, may be poorly matched to a secure 
system [Ref. 11]. 
In hardware, the Central Processing Unit (CPU) which includes a Memory 
Management Unit, I/O processor and some other function units (i.e. arithmetic logical 
unit (ALU), stack pointer) is responsible for supporting operating system mechanisms 
that isolate the system state from untrusted subjects, and subjects from each other. As 
mentioned in Chapter II, such isolation mechanisms are user/supervisor state, address 
space separation, segment or page protection (address protection). 
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A.       ANALYSIS OF THE IA-64 SECURITY FEATURES 
As described in Chapter IV, the IA-64 architecture supports several mechanisms 
for building secure systems: 
• Multiple  operating  system modes:  Multiple  Address  Space  (MAS) 
operating systems and Single Address Space (SAS) operating systems 
• Address Space Management: Regions and Region Identifiers (RIDs) 
• Multitasking: Context Switching 
• Privileged levels and privilege level transfer 
• TLB based per page protection: TLB access rights and TLB privilege level 
• Domain-level granular protection: Protection Key Registers (PKRs) 
• Miscellaneous: Application Registers (ARs), System Registers, Register 
Stack Engine (RSE). 
1.        Previous Function State Application Register (PFS) 
As described in Chapter HI, the Previous Function State Application Register 
(PFS) contains multiple fields: pfm, pec and ppl. These values are copied automatically 
on a call from the Current Frame Marker (CFM) Register, Epilog Count Register (EC), 
and PSR.cpl (current privilege level in the processor status register) to accelerate 
procedure calling. 
When a br.call instruction is executed, the CFM, EC and PSR.cpl are copied to 
the PFS application register, which can be directly read or written by the application 
software. Here, the CFM holds the state of the current stack frame and register rename 
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bases (RRBs) for GRs, FRs and PRs. RRB is used to rename the registers within the 
rotating subset of each register type. The PSR.cpl is a piece of information that must not 
be modified by the user programs. Otherwise, a process might gain unauthorized 
privilege and execute a privileged instruction that affects the processor state. However, 
the PSR.cpl field in the PFS can be modified to escalate the privilege level on execution 
of a branch return (br.ret) instruction since this register is writable. To prevent such 
modification, a check exists in the IA-64 architecture to make sure that copying PFS.ppl 
to PSR.cpl will not increase the privilege level before the copying is actually performed. 
2.        Privileged Level Transfer 
As mentioned in Chapter TV, the IA-64 architecture provides two instructions, the 
epc and break to provide privilege level transfers. 
The break instruction, as in traditional architectures, jumps to a fault handler, 
which should be a valid address mapping for each user application, and raises the 
privilege level to the most privileged level via a system call. Here, a valid address 
mapping determines the page address to handle an interrupt by using processor's 
interruption vector tables. These tables include interrupt types associated with interrupt 
vector names (in this case, Break Instruction vector). From the type of the interrupt given 
in the table, the operating system determines the handling routine. 
The epc  instruction implements  calls  to higher-privileged routines  without 
interruption to reduce system calls overhead. Using the br.call instruction, a user 
application branches to an execute only kernel page (TLB.ar = 7). Further the epc 
instruction is executed as the first instruction in the kernel page to raise the privilege 
level. The new privilege level is given by the TLB entry of the page containing the epc 
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instruction. After completing the system call, the kernel returns to the user system with a 
branch return (br.ret) instruction. 
When the branch call (br.call) instruction is executed, the following actions occur: 
{Ref. 15] 
• The current values of the Current Frame Marker (CFM), the Epilog Count 
(EC) application register and the current privilege level in the Processor 
Status Register (PSR.cpl) are saved in the Previous Function State 
Register. 
• The caller's stack frame is saved and the callee is provided with a frame 
containing only the caller's output region. See "Register Stack Engine" in 
Chapter EL 
• The Rotation Rename Base (RRB) registers in the CFM are reset to '0'. 
When the br.ret instruction is executed, following actions occur: [Ref. 15] 
• CFM, EC, and the current privilege level are restored from PFS (The 
privilege level is restored only if this does not increase privilege level). 
• The caller's stack frame is restored. 
• If the return lowers the privilege (numerically increases) and lower 
privilege level transfer trap field in the PSR is '1', then a lower-privilege 
Transfer trap is taken. 
In general, the system call mechanisms give the user process the potential to call 
malicious code rather than the code intended by its caller. This can be accomplished 
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using a stack-smashing attack, which represents the majority of current overflow attacks. 
The attack takes advantage of the call function, which inserts the return address in the 
stack. The stack-smashing attack corrupts the return address of the function being called. 
To prevent such attacks, the compiler can be designed to generate code that checks for 
stack smashing every time a function returns [Ref. 16]. In the IA-64 architecture, 
although return addresses are stored into branch registers, they might be spilled to the 
register stack eventually. In cases where the return address resides in a branch register, a 
malicious user can modify the return address by making indirect branch calls since these 
registers are not privileged registers in the IA-64. 
With respect to stack-smashing attacks, another protection mechanism can be 
offered by making the data segment of the program's address space non-executable. This 
makes it impossible for attackers to execute the malicious code they injected into the 
program's input buffers. However, this form of protection does not provide protection 
against other forms of attacks such as corrupting the code pointers (program state that 
points at code) by changing the pointer arguments. Thus, the kernel page code in the IA- 
64 architecture should be written carefully by the operating system programmers to guard 
against the cases where a buffer overflow is used to sneak code into the system [Ref. 16]. 
3.        Hardware Based Protection Mechanisms 
As mentioned earlier in the third chapter, the IA-64 architecture defines many 
functional features in hardware as well as in software for protecting processes from each 
other. These protection mechanisms are address space separation via region identifiers, 
privilege levels, access rights, and protection keys. Of the mechanisms supported by the 
architecture, address space separation is defined on a region basis and is enforced by the 
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handling of region identifiers (REDs) by trusted software (in this case, the operating 
system). Region identifiers, placed in one of eight region registers by software, can be 
considered unique IDs in a Multiple Address Space (MAS) operating systems and assign 
a private region to each process. In the IA-64 architecture, because each translation in the 
TLB is tagged with its region identifier, the TLB can manage translations associated with 
different address spaces. Accordingly, on an address space switch, the operating system 
need not purge all the TLB entries which belong to a process. Historically, with respect to 
the context switches, there are two components: the cost of saving and restoring state and 
the cost of translation lookaside buffer (TLB) misses caused by the address space change 
[Ref. 7]. By implementing process ID tags in its TLB entries, the IA-64 architecture has 
decreased the rate of TLB misses and the overhead of context switching. 
"Appropriately configured, processes have no way to generate memory addresses 
that reference regions owned by some other processes, unless the operating system grants 
shared access to a particular region" [Ref. 6]. The major advantages of private address 
spaces are: (1) they increase the amount of address available to all programs; (2) they 
provide hard memory protection limits; and (3) they allow a cleanup when a process exits 
from the region [Ref. 12]. The disadvantage of this type of approach is that process 
isolation within private virtual address space might generate problems such as effective 
cooperation between protected processes. Specifically, pointers, whose function is to 
make references to various data structures during the execution of a program, have no 
meaning beyond the boundary or lifetime of the process that creates them. Moreover, the 
use of pointers usually requires prior coordination for the use of the address space for 
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shared regions. Thus, sharing patterns must be known statically. As a result, pointer- 
based information is not easily shared, stored or transmitted [Ref. 12]. 
As described in Chapter IV, in the IA-64 architecture, sharing between processes 
in a Multiple Address Space Operating Systems (MAS) is achieved by mapping region 
identifiers into the region register set of multiple processes. The use of regions and region 
identifiers provides a mechanism for efficient address space-to-address space copies 
(cross-address space copies). Cross address spaces allow a user process to link a program 
in another address space without compromising the security of the address space. In this 
scheme, if two processes working on the same processor want to communicate with each 
other, process A's address space is mapped to process B's address space statically by the 
kernel. If process B has the access right read-only, then it does not need its own copy of 
address space. When process B wants to write this address space, the operating system 
makes a copy of the region, and assigns it to process B. From then on, process B can have 
both read and write access rights to the new region. In the IA-64 architecture, "because 
address spaces are tied to RIDs and not to a particular static region, a MAS operating 
system can simply copy a memory range from one address space to another by 
temporarily remapping the target location to another region" [Ref. 2]. Furthermore, since 
each page can have its own access rights associated with the RID, the operating system 
can assign different access rights to the mapped page by using protection key registers. 
Allocation of a common region to multiple processes is strictly managed by the operating 
system. However, without the use of protection key registers, this type of sharing will 
still be somewhat limited, since there is no way to provide different views of the same 
page. If multiple processes are to share the same page, they cannot access the page with 
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different access rights because two page table entries cannot reside in the TLB with the 
same region identifier and having different access rights. Consequently, this limitation 
will result in enforcing a poor security mechanism among processes since they cannot be 
assigned to different hierarchical classifications and security clearances (e.g. secret, top 
secret). Thus, it may be difficult to enforce security policy in the system efficiently and 
coherent views of information may be lost. 
Unlike in the Multiple Address Space model, in the Single Address Space model 
the system rather than the applications coordinates the address bindings to hold dynamic 
sharing patterns in a uniform way. In the IA-64 architecture, the Single Address Space 
(SAS) model requires the use of protection key registers. This removes sharing problems 
between processes by treating all virtual address space as a global resource controlled by 
the operating system. The implementation of a Single Address Space mode IA-64 
architecture is achieved by enabling the protection key field in the Processor Status 
Register (PSR.pk) by the operating system. 
As described in Chapter IV, protection keys provide a method to restrict 
permission by tagging each virtual page with a protection domain identifier. The 
Protection Key Registers (PKRs) define a set of registers that caches all protection keys 
required by a process. In addition, each TLB entry contains a protection key field, which 
is placed in the TLB when a virtual-to-physical translation is created. When a memory 
reference hits in the TLB, the processor searches for the matching entry's key in the PKR 
cache. A key match results in additional access rights (write, read, execute) being 
checked before the memory reference is granted. Otherwise, the hardware generates a 
Key Miss fault and the operating system must abort the access or insert the correct 
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protection key into the PKRs and retry the access. This is explained thoroughly in Section 
D, Chapter IV. In this scheme, "the processor has no notion of which protection keys 
belong to which process. The only check the hardware performs is to compare the 
protection key from the translation to any valid protection keys in the PKR cache" [Ref 
2]. On a context switch, the operating system must purge any valid protection keys from 
the PKRs that might provide unauthorized access rights to a switched-process. 
Protection keys are used to provide different access rights to shared TLB entries 
for each process. For instance, consider a page tagged with a protection key number OxF. 
Two processes are supposed to share this page: one is the owner of the page and the other 
is a user. When the owner process is running, the operating system will insert a valid key 
into the PKR cache with the protection key OxF and the 'wd', 'rd', and 'xd' bits cleared. 
This will permit the running process to access the page with read, write and execute 
access rights. However, when the user process is running, the operating system will insert 
a valid key with the protection key OxF, but this time, only the 'rd' bit is cleared to permit 
this process to read the page, but denying write or execute access [Ref. 2]. 
To make use of the single address space model without sacrificing the major 
advantages of the multiple address space model, the IA-64 implements hybrid S AS/MAS 
models that combine unique RIDs for per process region and shared RIDs with protection 
keys for per-page protection. Similar to the MAS model, the current privilege level field 
in the Processor Status Register (PSR.cpl) is compared with the page's TLB entry 
(TLB.pl) on a memory reference in the hybrid S AS/MAS model. If PSR.cpl is less than 
or equal to TLB.pl, access is permitted. Additionally, the type of the access is checked 
against the access-rights field, TLB.ar, in the TLB entry. But this time, the processor also 
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searches for the matching entry's key in the PKR cache. As previously explained, a key 
match results in additional access rights (write, read, execute) being checked before 
granting or denying the memory reference. In the hybrid SAS/MAS model, access denials 
in the protection key registers always override the access rights field in the TLB entry. 
4.        Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on how IA-64 architecture protection features enable the 
processor hardware and the operating system to collaborate to enforce the security 
features among the processes. Since the hardware protection mechanisms are crucial to 
meeting the requirements of Reference Monitor Concept abstraction, it is required that 
hardware security features be supported with complementary software. 
In the IA-64 architecture, translation lookaside buffer (TLB) structure is central to 
the platform's protection mechanisms. Implementing privilege levels, access rights and 
protection keys in its structure, the TLB provides protection and sharing in a well-defined 
manner. Protection keys are especially useful in the sense that they provide different 
access rights for each process to shared TLB entries. This feature enables memory 
locations to be assigned different security attributes for different processes for efficient 
enforcement of security policy. 
In addition, privilege level transfer in the architecture has been reviewed. Since 
system call implementations are usually not designed to prevent exploitations, operating 
system programmers should take into account possible attacks commonly associated with 
these calls and returns when writing code for TLB-resident execute-only pages. 
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VI.    SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis presents an analysis of the IA-64 processor's support for secure 
systems. A secure system must provide security features in hardware as well as in 
software without sacrificing performance and efficiency. Hardware security features are 
very critical to a system's security. Current architectures mostly suffer when trying to 
implement hardware security features efficiently, and therefore have trouble enforcing 
security policies reliably and correctly. 
In this thesis, the hardware requirements of a secure system are described. And 
further, these requirements are mapped to the IA-64 processor's hardware security 
mechanisms. Hardware protection mechanisms supported by the architecture are 
privilege levels, access rights, isolation of processes into separate address spaces 
(regions, region identifiers) and protection keys. Privilege levels, access rights, and 
protection key-based memory protection mechanisms are embedded in the translation 
lookaside buffer (TLB) structure implemented by the processor architecture. 
Four different privilege levels (0 to 3) are supported by the architecture to control 
access to memory address spaces, system instructions and system registers. Level 0, the 
most privileged level, is reserved for the operating system use and it is the only level in 
which a privileged instruction can be executed. Each memory access compares the 
current privilege level of the process with the privilege level that resides in the TLB entry 
(TLB.pl)   for  the   associated  page   during   virtual-to-physical   address  translations. 
According to the result of the comparison, access is granted or denied. If granted, the type 
of the access (i.e. read, write, execute) is obtained from the "access rights" field of the 
TLB entries (TLB.ar). 
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Region identifiers (RJODs) are implemented in the architecture to provide a distinct 
address space separation among processes. These identifiers, placed in one of eight 
region registers by the operating system, are used to map a process's address space onto 
the system's virtual regions. Furthermore, each translation entry in the TLB has a RID 
associated with it. This feature enables the TLB to hold translations from many different 
address spaces. As a result, the processor does not have to flush the entire TLB upon 
address space switches. 
To support the Single Address Space (SAS) operating system model, the 
protection key registers (PKRs) are provided by the architecture. These restrict 
permission by tagging each virtual page with a protection domain identifier. The 
Protection Key Registers (PKRs) define a set of registers that caches all protection keys 
required by a process. Although the hardware performs the check to compare the 
protection key from the translation to any valid protection keys in the PKR cache, the 
operating system must be responsible for management and replacement policies of these 
registers at all times. Protection keys enable the processor to provide different access 
rights to each process that shares a TLB entry. This permits security attributes to be 
assigned to memory resources on a per process basis and supports efficient enforcement 
of security policy. 
In conclusion, the virtual memory model and translation lookaside buffer (TLB) 
structure are crucial features of the hardware protection mechanisms and multitasking 
support in the IA-64 architecture. The TLB structure supports memory protection on the 
basis of access rights, privilege levels and protection keys. Hardware privilege levels (0 
to 3) are used to distinguish between supervisor and user modes, and also ensure that 
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privileged instructions are executed only by the operating system. The access rights field 
in the TLB is used to restrict access to memory locations when privilege level of the 
currently executing process is less than the privilege level of the TLB-resident page. An 
alternative approach to controlling access to memory is accomplished by implementing 
protection key registers. Protection key checking can be enabled by the operating system. 
When enabled, "all the memory references go through protection key access checks 
during the virtual-to-physical address translations" [Ref. 2]. Protection keys are useful for 
providing different access rights to shared TLB entries. With appropriate configuration of 
these mechanisms, processes may be constrained from generating unauthorized memory 
references. 
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